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ABSTRACT
Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to pro-
tect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for 
the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare. It might 
be thought that the widespread acceptance of moral anti-realism would under-
mine the aims of environmental ethicists. One reason is that recent empirical 
studies purport to show that moral realists are more likely to act on the basis of 
their ethical convictions than anti-realists. In addition, it is sometimes argued 
that only moral realists can countenance the claim that nature is intrinsically 
valuable. Against this, we argue that the acceptance of moral anti-realism is no 
threat to the environmentalist cause. We argue, further, that the acceptance of 
moral realism is potentially an obstacle to delivering on a third core demand: 
namely, that successful action on climate change and environmental destruc-
tion requires us to change some of our commonly held ethical views and, in so 
doing, to pursue and ultimately achieve a workable consensus.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Environmental degradation and anthropogenic climate change pose some of 
the greatest challenges that humanity has ever faced. Many environmental eth-
icists have been arguing for decades that (i) swift action to protect our natural 
environment is morally paramount, and that (ii) our concern for the environ-
ment should go beyond its importance for human welfare: we should value 
the natural environment for its own sake.1 Do those who defend these com-
mitments have good reason to favour a particular meta-ethic? Moral realism 
might appear best suited to provide the moral resoluteness and firm grounding 
of beliefs in nature’s intrinsic value that environmental ethicists advocate. In 
contrast, moral anti-realism is often associated with the dangers of relativism 
and value anthropocentrism. 
We take moral realism to be the conjunction of the following three theses:
1) Moral Cognitivism: moral thoughts are beliefs that have (non-deflation-
ary) truth-apt propositions as their contents; moral sentences express these 
propositions.
2) Success Theory: there are moral facts; some of the propositions expressed 
by moral sentences are true.2 
3) Stance Independence: the standards that fix the truth of moral proposi-
tions are not themselves justified, made correct or made true in virtue of 
the beliefs, attitudes, agreements or conventions of actual or hypothetical 
appraisers.
A meta-ethic that denies any one (or more) of these theses is a form of anti-
realism. Broadly speaking, there are three salient varieties of anti-realism: the 
error theory, moral constructivism and expressivism. Of these, moral error the-
ory accepts (1) but denies (2): for the error theorist, moral thoughts are beliefs, 
but these beliefs are uniformly false. We concede that the error theory is prob-
ably an unwelcome meta-ethic for environmental ethicists; we therefore focus 
on the other two varieties.3 Moral constructivists accept (1) and (2), but deny 
(3): according to constructivists, moral facts are themselves ontologically de-
pendent upon facts about what moral appraisers accept, or would accept under 
1. There is great diversity in the views that fall under the umbrella of environmental ethics. 
However, we believe that these two propositions are fundamental for most – if not all – such 
views.
2. More specifically, success theory is the view that some positive moral propositions are true, 
where, roughly, a positive (deontic) moral proposition is one that entails the existence of a 
moral reason for someone to perform or refrain from performing an action. 
3. Error theory is certainly unwelcome in its most barefaced, eliminativist form, which recom-
mends that we abandon moral discourse altogether. Some error theorists, however, maintain 
that we can preserve moral discourse by treating morality as a fiction; see, for example, 
Richard Joyce (2001).
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certain conditions.4 Finally, expressivists deny (1): on the most basic form of 
expressivism, an appraiser’s thought is not a belief but a conative attitude of 
approval or disapproval. In uttering a moral sentence, a speaker expresses her 
attitude of (dis)approval towards some act or state of affairs. Do expressivists 
affirm (2) or (3) or reject them? This is a matter of dispute. Among the things 
we intend to argue in this paper is that, when (2) and (3) are properly under-
stood, expressivists can accept both claims. This is argued in section 3, below. 
We will provide more detail on these theories as we develop our argument, but 
we should point out that we largely operate with generic versions of expressiv-
ist and constructivist forms of anti-realism.
Should environmental ethicists hope that realism gains widespread ac-
ceptance, or prefer for people generally to be anti-realists?5 At this point an 
important qualification is due. Empirical research seems to suggest that ‘ordi-
nary’ people are not generally consistent in their meta-ethical beliefs (Goodwin 
and Darley 2008; Wright et al. 2013; Pölzler 2017). Rather, people appear to 
be realists about some moral beliefs and anti-realists about others. Our discus-
sion of the acceptance of realism as (dis)advantageous to the environmental 
ethicists’ cause is therefore fruitful only to the extent that people are (or are 
not) realists about those beliefs that directly concern the environmental cause. 
This includes beliefs about environmental values and virtues, aggregate harm 
and collective responsibility. In the following, then, we discuss the question of 
whether or not environmental ethicists should prefer people to be moral real-
ists with regard to these particular beliefs. 
Below, we consider and reject two arguments to the effect that ethicists 
who agree that (i) there is a need for swift action against environmental deg-
radation, and that (ii) nature is valuable for its own sake, should want to see 
that moral realism gains widespread currency. Furthermore, we argue that the 
acceptance of moral realism is potentially an obstacle to delivering on a third 
core environmental ethicist demand: namely, that (iii) successful action on cli-
mate change and environmental destruction requires us to change some of our 
commonly held ethical views and to achieve politically feasible consensus. 
In section two, we discuss conceptual and empirical arguments purporting to 
show that people who accept moral realism are more strongly motivated to 
act on the basis of their moral judgements than those who do not. If these 
arguments are cogent, then it would seem that environmentalists have instru-
mental reason to favour the promulgation of realism over other meta-ethical 
4. There is some dispute over whether constructivist views really belong on the anti-realist 
side in taxonomies of meta-ethics. The version of constructivism we have in mind is of the 
‘thoroughgoing’ or ‘meta-ethical’ variety that invokes no prior substantive moral claims in 
setting up the construction procedure that ‘fixes’ moral facts. For more on the varieties of 
constructivism, see Sharon Street (2010). 
5. This is assuming that environmental ethicists are fundamentally interested in solving environ-
mental problems; see also Andrew Light’s (2002b, 557ff) discussion on what environmental 
ethics is for.
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theories.6 We show that such conceptual arguments fail and, further, that the 
empirical evidence is inconclusive. In section three, we consider a second ar-
gument for the view that environmental ethicists should favour moral realism. 
Environmental ethicists have long defended the view that nature is intrinsically 
valuable. It is sometimes suggested that only realist theories of value can coun-
tenance the claim that nature has intrinsic value.7 We consider whether this is 
really so and conclude that, even though only moral realists can defend the 
objective value of nature, environmental ethicists can do without it.
After rebutting these two arguments in favour of moral realism, we present 
an argument against the desirability of a moral realist meta-ethic from an en-
vironmentalist point of view. We argue that, insofar as environmental ethicists 
demand that we adjust long-held moral views, acceptance of moral realism 
may well pose an obstacle to their agenda. We make a conceptual point to that 
effect, and also cite a recent empirical study suggesting that acceptance of 
realism inhibits individuals from changing their moral beliefs. In conclusion, 
we maintain that environmental ethics’ core agenda might be better served 
if anti-realism were to gain widespread acceptance amongst people. Even if 
anti-realist meta-ethics fail to deliver so-called objective values, expressiv-
ists and constructivists can accommodate the values central to environmental 
and climate ethics – in particular, several sub-types of what has been labelled 
‘intrinsic’ value. Anti-realists may be just as motivated to act on the basis of 
their moral beliefs, and are possibly more open to changing their mind and 
endorsing new notions of harm and responsibility. But crucially, acceptance 
of anti-realism holds a greater promise with respect to the achievement of a 
(new) moral consensus regarding our shared responsibility for collective harm 
to the environment. 
2. REALISM AND MORAL MOTIVATION
Deliberation in environmental ethics is likely to yield the conclusion that cur-
rently existing individuals have a strong moral obligation to make significant 
sacrifices to their personal levels of well-being. This gives rise to a concern 
about moral motivation: even if individuals acknowledge that they have a 
moral obligation to scale back their environmental footprint, there is no assur-
ance that they will comply with this obligation. It might be thought that realists 
are more likely than anti-realists to comply with their own moral convictions. 
In connection with the concerns of environmental ethicists, Darren Domsky 
(2004, 685–687) offers an argument along the following lines: because real-
ists take their moral judgements to reflect objective, stance-independent moral 
6. Darren Domsky (2003, 685–687) presses an argument along these lines in connection with 
the concerns of environmental ethicists.
7. Both Tom Regan (1981) and Holmes Rolston III (1994) advance arguments of this kind. 
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facts, they acknowledge that the authority of morality has its source in some-
thing external to their own preferences.8 Insofar as they acknowledge this 
external authority, the argument goes, agents will be more likely to comply 
with what they acknowledge to be requirements of morality. Anti-realists, by 
contrast, do not take morality to have such an external authority. Indeed, the 
self-aware anti-realist understands that her moral commitments are shaped by 
contingent and arbitrary social and biological forces. Unfortunately, reflection 
on this kind of contingency makes it easier for us to dismiss or ignore the moral 
obligations that we affirm.
If the above line of reasoning were cogent, it would give environmental 
ethicists a pragmatic reason to prefer the widespread acceptance of realism to 
the acceptance of anti-realism. But are there good reasons to believe that anti-
realists are less likely to act on their moral convictions? Before we answer this 
question, let us clarify. There is, first, the (conceptual) worry that rejection of 
stance independence entails a belief in the less-than-categorical nature of our 
moral obligations. Second, there might be the (practical) worry that as a matter 
of fact those who believe in stance independence are more motivated to act on 
their moral convictions than those who do not hold that belief. We will address 
each worry in turn.
Let us begin by explaining how a sophisticated version of expressivism 
deals with the conceptual worry. Anti-realist expressivists take moral judge-
ment to be essentially connected with certain conative attitudes. Where deontic 
moral judgements are concerned, the relevant conative attitude can be thought 
of as norm acceptance, or moral subscription to a norm. Very roughly, moral 
subscription to a norm, n, consists in an intention and a disposition both to 
conform one’s actions to n, and to encourage others to conform to n. It also 
consists in a tendency to take a negative conative attitude (e.g. disapproval, 
anger or guilt) towards those who violate n (see Copp 1995, ch.5; Gibbard 
1990, ch.4). For an expressivist, moral judgements just are attitudes of norm 
acceptance or moral subscription. An appraiser judges that x is wrong just in 
case she morally subscribes to a set of norms that forbid x. Her utterance of ‘x 
is wrong’ expresses her attitude of subscription to a set of norms that forbids x 
(see Gibbard 1990, ch.3). 
Simon Blackburn mitigates the conceptual worry on behalf of expressivism 
as follows: an expressivist who acknowledges the contingent origins of her at-
titudes must ask herself whether the appropriate response to this knowledge is 
to take her obligations less seriously than she otherwise would. As Blackburn 
points out, however, this is itself a normative question. How the reflective ex-
pressivist answers the question depends upon whether the norms to which she 
subscribes prescribe taking her accepted obligations lightly, if they have contin-
gent origins. Nevertheless, there is nothing that compels individuals to accept 
such a norm (Blackburn 1998, 286–291). In other words, the expressivist can 
8. Our way of framing this argument also owes much to Simon Blackburn (1998, 286–294).
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insist that questions concerning stance independence are themselves asking 
about first-order moral matters; how an expressivist answers those questions 
will depend upon the kinds of norms to which she subscribes. Importantly, 
we should expect many expressivists to subscribe to norms that forbid certain 
kinds of action regardless of the social context in which those actions are per-
formed. For instance, an expressivist can subscribe to a set of norms that forbid 
acts of striking children regardless of the social context, and even where the 
agents themselves belongs to a culture whose members subscribe to a contrary 
norm (see Blackburn 1984, 218; Gibbard 1990, 164ff).
Similar things might be said by certain types of constructivists. Consider, 
for instance, a form of procedural constructivism according to which an 
appraiser’s judgement that a given act is wrong is just a belief with the prop-
ositional content that, were the appraiser’s beliefs and values in reflective 
equilibrium, she would subscribe to norms that forbid that act. For a construc-
tivist of this sort, the truth-conditions for a speaker’s utterance of ‘striking 
children is wrong’ are determined by whether, were she in reflective equilib-
rium, she would subscribe to norms that prohibit striking children. If those 
norms make no exceptions for social context, then the constructivist speaks 
truly when she utters the sentence: ‘striking a child is morally wrong wherever 
you happen to be from in the world’. It should be noted that we cannot focus on 
all or even the most important versions of constructivism here.9 We merely aim 
to show that the rejection of stance independence need not weaken or relativise 
our moral obligations.
It is worth noting that there is an influential argument suggesting that it is 
realists, rather than anti-realists, who face a problem with respect to ensuring 
that agents are motivated to fulfil what they judge to be their obligation.10 For 
expressivists, to judge that one has an obligation to perform an act is to have 
a certain motivational state that disposes the agent to perform the action (e.g. 
an attitude of approval towards performing the action). This means there is a 
necessary connection between judging an act to be obligatory for oneself and 
being pro tanto motivated to do it. By contrast, moral realists, especially those 
who subscribe to naturalism, take the connection between moral belief and 
moral motivation to be contingent. If this sort of realism is true, then convinc-
ing an agent that she is obligated to do x does not suffice in ensuring that she 
has pro tanto motivation to do x. One would additionally need to ensure that 
she has a desire to do x (or perhaps a de dicto desire to do that which is obliga-
tory). It seems to us wise not to hang too much on the argument just canvassed 
here, however. Whether or not acceptance of realism yields greater or lesser 
9. According to Street (2010), ‘[t]he most prominent characterizations of constructivism in eth-
ics have important threads in common, but none would command universal assent, even 
among self-described constructivists’ (364).
10. The argument sketched here has its origin in David Hume’s ([1739] 2000) Treatise of Human 
Nature (see especially sect. 3.1.1)
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motivation to carry out what one judges to be obligatory for oneself is, ulti-
mately, an empirical question, not one that can be settled by a priori analysis.
Even if the acceptance of moral anti-realism does not (conceptually) com-
pel us to take our obligations lightly, the more important question is whether 
we in fact do take them more lightly, in the event that anti-realism is true and 
our moral attitudes have contingent origins. This is, as we have just suggested, 
an empirical question. A recent study by Liane Young and A.J. Durwin (2013) 
attempts to make some headway towards an answer.11 Young and Durwin’s 
experimenters approached passersby and asked them to make a charitable do-
nation. The subjects were divided into three groups. Subjects in the first group 
were asked a leading question, designed to prime them with realist beliefs: 
‘Do you agree that some things are just morally right or wrong, good or bad, 
wherever you happen to be from in the world?’ A second group of subjects 
were asked a question intended to prime them with anti-realist beliefs: ‘Do 
you agree that our morals and values are shaped by our culture and upbringing, 
so there are no absolute right answers to any moral questions?’ A third group 
served as control, and were not primed with any meta-ethical question. 
Young and Durwin report that, with one exception, every subject answered 
affirmatively to the meta-ethical question posed to them.12 After being primed, 
the subjects were asked to donate money to a charity for impoverished chil-
dren. The researchers found that subjects primed with the anti-realist question 
were no less likely to donate money than the control group, which had not been 
primed. According to these findings, the contingency of our moral attitudes 
does not, in general, weaken our motivation to comply with the moral demands 
that we acknowledge. However, those subjects primed with the realist question 
were twice as likely to donate money than those in the control and anti-realist 
groups. If agreement with realism indeed strengthens people’s moral resolve,13 
then environmental ethicists would seem to have reason to hope that moral re-
alism, rather than anti-realism, gains currency amongst ordinary people. While 
anti-realism may not make us worse off with respect to moral motivation, it 
does seem to impose an opportunity cost since it prevents us from reaping the 
motivational benefits that come with the acceptance of realism.14 
11. To our knowledge, this is the first and only empirical study examining the link between 
meta-ethical realism and moral motivation. There exist a few studies discussing the rela-
tionship between moral deliberation in normative ethics and real-world behaviour, such as 
Schwitzgebel and Rust (2014), but this question does not concern us here.
12. Plausibly, they suggest that this can be explained by the fact that ‘laypeople endorse cer-
tain aspects of both realism and anti-realism and, more generally, hold somewhat flexible, 
context-dependent meta-ethical views’ (Young and Durwin 2013, 303).
13. Although Domsky’s (2004, 685f) claim that anti-realism imposes a motivational cost is 
confuted by Young and Durwin’s study, his additional contention that realism confers a mo-
tivational benefit is hereby confirmed.
14. Anti-realists might object that it is not entirely obvious that Young and Durwin’s findings 
with respect to charitable donations can be extended to the sorts of obligations moral agents 
hold with respect to nature. Indeed, most people see charitable donations as supererogatory 
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There is significant ambiguity, however, in the formulation of the ‘primes’ 
in this study. The authors appear to equate moral anti-realism with moral rel-
ativism, and realism with universalism. In effect, the subjects in this study 
were primed with universalist versus relativist beliefs. Naturally, moral anti-
realism allows for moral relativism – the view that there are no universal moral 
standards15 – while realism does not. But anti-realism does not entail relativ-
ism; indeed, it is compatible with moral universalism. We can therefore say 
that the group that was primed with a relativist statement was primed with 
(a version of) anti-realism. The group that was primed with a non-relativist 
statement, however, was not clearly primed with regard to a particular meta-
ethical stance. In other words, the ‘realist’ priming question used in Young and 
Durwin’s 2013 study does not rule out various forms of moral anti-realism, 
including at least a generic type of proceduralist constructivism. Sophisticated 
anti-realists can (and, if they are decent, probably should) affirm the sort of 
questions that Young and Durwin utilise to prime their subjects with realist-
sounding thoughts. But if that is so, then the supposed motivational benefits of 
affirming such claims may be enjoyed by anti-realists, too.16
What the study seems to show, then, is that those who are definitely primed 
with a particular variety of anti-realism donate less than those who are primed 
with a view that is not clearly anti-realist. Yet it is also true that those who are 
primed with that particular version of anti-realism do not donate less than those 
who have not been primed at all, and who – for all we know – could be moral 
realists.17 In our view, Young and Durwin’s study is therefore inconclusive as 
to whether a belief in moral realism yields motivational advantages that are 
unavailable to sophisticated anti-realists. However, nothing we have said rules 
out the possibility that a commitment to moral realism’s unique features, such 
as moral objectivism, really does positively impact moral motivation. Perhaps 
future studies will show this to be so, but we are not aware of any existing 
study making the case for moral realism by linking objectivism (rather than 
universalism) with moral motivation. The upshot of this discussion seems to 
actions. By contrast, environmental ethicists’ aim is to encourage agents to accept that ac-
tions such as reducing one’s carbon footprint are not merely supererogatory, but obligatory: 
the agent who wastefully emits greenhouse gasses, for example, does not merely fail to do 
good, but acts wrongly in causing aggregate harm. It might be argued that, where strict ob-
ligations are concerned, the motivational advantage of realist beliefs would remain unclear. 
We are nevertheless unsure whether this line of response is promising for anti-realism or not.
15. Or, to be more precise, according to moral relativism: ‘[m]oral claims are true only relative to 
some standard or framework; and [t]his standard or framework is not itself uniquely justified’ 
(Levy 2002, 16).
16. Young and Durwin speculate about why realist-sounding claims might enhance agent’s reso-
luteness. Nevertheless, the mechanisms they consider do not seem obviously at odds with the 
sort of explanations that an anti-realist might offer. 
17. It is left completely open what the views of those in the control group might be. They may 
not have been primed with any type of belief, but it is at least possible in principle that they 
are all moral realists who are not willing to give much. 
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be that environmental ethicists should perhaps fear moral relativism, or at least 
its widespread acceptance, rather than anti-realism.18 
Finally, even if the acceptance of moral realism did itself enhance agents’ 
compliance with their perceived moral obligations (and we have no evidence 
yet that it does), this would be a welcomed advantage only if those agents’ 
moral judgements were shown to be true or otherwise desirable. Where an 
agent has profoundly misguided moral judgements, strengthening her resolve 
may well make matters worse. Consider, for instance, someone who is con-
vinced that environmental regulations unjustifiably curtail important economic 
liberties and thus constitute a serious injustice. Strengthening this agent’s res-
oluteness to comply with, to propagate and to enforce her perceived moral 
obligations would arguably make the world worse off, at least with respect to 
matters regarding the environment. In sum, strengthening the moral motiva-
tion of agents can benefit environmental ethics only when a sufficient number 
of agents accept the sorts of moral judgements that environmental ethicists 
seek to promote. 
3. ANTI-REALISM AND INTRINSIC VALUE
One might still think that environmental ethicists should favour realism for 
its substantive advantages with respect to the content of first-order ethics. 
For instance, it is sometimes argued that, in order to satisfactorily ensure that 
humans will protect natural objects in the future, we must recognise in our 
ethical outlook a direct obligation to preserve and protect these entities; an 
ethic that recognises agents as having direct obligations only to other agents is 
insufficient to justify and motivate the kinds of actions necessary to mitigate 
environmental degradation and global climate change. Nevertheless, the argu-
ment continues, a direct obligation to protect nature can exist only if the value 
of natural entities obtains independently of human valuers.19
At this point, it should be noted that not all environmental philosophers 
are equally worried about the adequacy of indirect obligations to nature as 
the foundation of an environmental ethic. Environmental pragmatists such as 
Andrew Light point out that there may be practical advantages in embracing an 
anthropocentric notion of the value of nature (see also Weston 1985; O’Neill et 
18. This conclusion seems to be supported by studies showing that simple exposure to moral 
relativism increases the likelihood of immoral behaviour in human agents (see, for example, 
Rai and Holyoak, 2013). In other words, the existing evidence hints at an inverse correlation 
between relativism and motivation.
19. For instance, Light writes that: ‘[s]ince the inception of environmental ethics in the early 
1970s, the principal question that has occupied the time of most philosophers working in the 
field is how the value of nature could best be described such that nature is directly morally 
considerable, in and of itself, rather than only indirectly morally considerable, because it is 
appreciated or needed by humans’ (Light 2002a, 426).
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al. 2008). According to Light’s methodological environmental pragmatism, it 
is easier to motivate political action on environmental problems if we are able 
to appeal to ‘human-centred motivations without endorsing crass versions of 
anthropocentrism’, since humans tend to ‘think about the value of nature in 
human terms’ (Light 2002b, 561). In other words, Light thinks that not only 
should we be pluralists about the source of nature’s value in philosophy, but 
that it can be advantageous for public policy to embrace some level of en-
vironmental anthropocentrism (see also Weston 1985). Our argument in the 
remainder of this section is thus directed at those who reject or are otherwise 
dissatisfied with environmental pragmatism.
The idea we are grappling with here is often expressed by the claim that 
an ethic that grounds direct obligations to preserve the environment must as-
sign non-human natural entities (such as plants, ecosystems and non-human 
animals) some form of intrinsic value.20 Some environmental ethicists have ar-
gued that to ascribe intrinsic value to such entities is to ascribe to them a value 
that they possess independently of how they relate to moral appraisers.21 But 
only moral realists, the argument goes, can accommodate the claim that some 
things possess value in this way. Because anti-realists (including pragmatists) 
reject stance independence, any value ascribed to an object must be grounded 
in facts about how that object relates to appraisers.22 Consequently, an anti-
realist meta-ethic cannot accommodate a first-order ethic that includes direct 
obligations to protect nature. Moral anti-realism, therefore, would deprive en-
vironmental ethicists of powerful argumentative resources. 
Is it true that only realists can accommodate ascriptions of intrinsic value 
to non-human natural objects? It is sometimes argued that one’s meta-ethical 
commitments place no constraints on one’s first-order moral commitments.23 
If that is right, then the realists’ concern that anti-realism cannot accommodate 
intrinsic value judgements must be mistaken, and there is no cause for concern. 
We are doubtful, however, of the thesis that meta-ethical commitments do not 
constrain the availability of normative positions,24 and so we cannot help our-
selves to such a quick dismissal of the realist’s challenge. 
20. Regan (1981, 31f) explicitly suggests that the intrinsic value of natural entities is sufficient to 
ground direct obligations to preserve those entities. It is less clear whether he takes their hav-
ing intrinsic value as necessary for our having direct obligations to them. In any case, what is 
clear is that he takes such obligations in fact to be grounded in the intrinsic value of natural 
entities.
21. Authors who argue that natural objects possess value independently of moral appraisers in-
clude Rolston (1994), as well as Paul Taylor (1986) and Robin Attfield (1991). It should be 
noted, though, that Taylor uses the term ‘inherent worth’ for this kind of value.
22. The locus classicus for this kind of argument is G.E. Moore ([1922] 1959), yet both Regan 
(1981) and Rolston (1994) also advance arguments in this spirit.
23. John O’Neill (1992), for instance, writes that ‘meta-ethical commitments are logically inde-
pendent of ethical ones’ (123). 
24. At least one reason for such doubts is that certain forms of contractarian constructivism 
seem at least prima facie unable to accommodate the normative view that agents have direct 
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Above, we distinguished three varieties of moral anti-realism: construc-
tivism, expressivism and the error theory. We believe that some varieties of 
constructivism and expressivism can accommodate ascriptions of non-anthro-
pocentric intrinsic value, as we shall argue below. Showing this is nevertheless 
complicated by some ambiguity as to what is meant by ‘intrinsic value’. In 
what follows, we disambiguate these different meanings and argue that ver-
sions of anti-realist theories can accommodate all but one sub-type of ‘intrinsic 
value’. 
It is increasingly common to use ‘intrinsic value’ to denote non-instrumen-
tal value – that is, value that does not depend upon its causing some further 
object or state of affairs that, itself, has value.25 Within this broad conception 
of intrinsic value as non-instrumental value, several narrower conceptions are 
possible. According to one salient understanding, a thing has intrinsic value if it 
has value that depends solely upon its intrinsic, non-relational properties.26 Let 
us call this Moore’s conception of intrinsic value, since it is usually attributed 
to G.E. Moore. These two conceptions of intrinsic value are not equivalent. In 
fact, the broader conception countenances value based on extrinsic properties. 
To illustrate this point, consider an authentic Van Gogh painting alongside a 
perfect replica of it, painted by an anonymous art student. There is nothing 
incoherent about the claim that, whatever the non-instrumental value of the au-
thentic Van Gogh, the replica is less valuable than the original. To account for 
this difference in value, however, one must identify a difference in the prop-
erties possessed by the two paintings. However, ex hypothesi, the paintings 
share all of the same intrinsic properties; the only salient difference between 
the two artworks concerns a relational, extrinsic property: one was painted by 
Van Gogh, while the other was not. Thus, at least some of the non-instrumental 
value of the original Van Gogh depends upon its extrinsic properties. The non-
instrumental value of the Van Gogh is not equivalent to the value it has solely 
in virtue of its intrinsic properties. 
A further way in which ‘intrinsic value’ has been understood is to mean 
objective value: value that is independent of any valuer, or that has its grounds 
obligations to protect entities that are incapable of deliberation. For discussion of the re-
lationship between meta-ethical commitments and normative commitments, see Sumner 
(1967), Tanner (2013) and Schroeder (2017).
25. Many environmental ethicists have criticised our traditional, commonsense ethical outlook 
for failing to ascribe non-instrumental value to nature. Not only do they consider this ethical 
outlook to be false, but also they fear that it prevents us from adequately addressing environ-
mental problems. We find this sort of argument implicit in Sylvan (1973), for instance, and 
explicit in Katz (1987) or Katz and Oechsli (1993). The former, for instance, argues that the 
notion of intrinsic value is important but not all-important to environmental ethics; rather, 
‘it serves to limit the exclusive reliance on anthropocentric instrumental values’ (Katz 1987, 
240).
26. In ‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value’, Moore ([1922] 1959) writes that: ‘[t]o say that a kind 
of value is ‘intrinsic’ means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what 
degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question’ (260).
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in something other than human beings and their attitudes. Let us call this the 
objective conception of intrinsic value. We have, then, at least three differ-
ent conceptions of ‘intrinsic value’: non-instrumental value, Moorean intrinsic 
value and objective value. In the following, we consider each of these concep-
tions in turn, and discuss whether they can be accommodated by anti-realism 
and, further, whether they are essential for an environmental ethic.’.
Let us begin with non-instrumental value. As others have noted, anti-real-
ists can accommodate moral judgements to the effect that states of affairs and 
objects – for instance, natural environments – have non-instrumental value 
(see, for example, O’Neill 1992; O’Neill et al. 2008). To see how expressiv-
ism can accommodate this moral judgement, let us begin with the observation 
that there is a certain conative state of mind that we can justly call valuing. It 
may be that this state of mind is reducible to other conative attitudes, such as 
desiring, or desiring to desire. But anti-realists can also allow that valuing is a 
sui generis mental state. Next, notice that one can value an object instrumen-
tally or non-instrumentally. For instance, Adam can instrumentally value his 
collection of rare vinyls for how it helps him attract attention among his fel-
low students; alternatively, he can value the collection for its own sake. With 
this distinction in hand, we can build up to anti-realist accounts of evaluative 
judgements about what is good and bad. 
For one kind of expressivist, an appraiser’s judgement that a thing is non-
instrumentally valuable can be identified simply with her non-instrumentally 
valuing that thing (see Blackburn 1998, 70). Alternatively, an expressivist can 
say that to judge that a thing is non-instrumentally good is simply to subscribe 
to norms that require non-instrumentally valuing that thing (see Gibbard 2003, 
7). Since there is nothing conceptually or psychologically implausible about 
normal human appraisers non-instrumentally valuing natural environments (or 
subscribing to norms that require non-instrumentally valuing natural environ-
ments), expressivists have no trouble accommodating judgements to the effect 
that natural environments are non-instrumentally valuable. 
In a similar way, non-instrumental value judgements can be accommodated 
by standard forms of moral constructivism. According to one kind of construc-
tivist account of non-instrumental goodness, an appraiser’s judgement to the 
effect that a thing is non-instrumentally good is a belief with the propositional 
content that she would non-instrumentally value that thing, if she were in an 
ideal epistemic position (see Lewis 1989, 113). On an alternative constructiv-
ist account, the relevant propositional content is that, if her beliefs and values 
were in reflective equilibrium, the appraiser would subscribe to a set of norms 
that requires non-instrumentally valuing the thing in question. Insofar as it 
seems conceptually possible that an agent in ideal epistemic conditions would 
instrumentally value nature, this kind of constructivism is compatible with the 
belief that nature has non-instrumental value. 
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Opponents of anti-realism might find this unsatisfying. The anti-realist’s 
way of understanding non-instrumental value judgements might be thought to 
make the value of nature too contingent an affair. According to this objection, 
anti-realists of the sort described above must still concede that, if we had a 
different psychology or different attitudes – that is, if humans failed to non-in-
strumentally value nature – then nature would have no non-instrumental value 
and we would have no direct obligation to preserve it.27 This, the objection 
continues, would be tantamount to denying that we have any direct obligation 
to preserve the environment at all: we only have such an obligation insofar as 
we care about (or value, or are disposed to value) the environment.
For expressivists, this sort of worry is easily parried. From their perspec-
tive, the claim that the environment would have no value if no one cared about 
it is just another first-order normative claim. To agree with such a claim is to 
subscribe to norms that contain the following prescription: value nature non-
instrumentally, but do so only on the condition that people in fact value it 
thus. Surely, however, those of us who non-instrumentally value nature do not 
subscribe to norms that prescribe valuing it only on the condition that people 
in fact value nature. Instead, we subscribe to norms that prescribe non-instru-
mentally valuing nature, and that prescribe protecting it unconditionally.28 
Constructivists can avail themselves of a similar manoeuvre to the one used 
by expressivists. Provided the norms that actual appraisers subscribe to in re-
flective equilibrium (or when assuming the practical point of view) prescribe 
an unconditional, non-instrumental valuing of nature, we speak falsely when 
we utter the sentence: ‘if no one valued nature, nature would have no non-
instrumental value, and there would be nothing wrong with destroying it’.29
Let us now turn to Moore’s conception of intrinsic value. To start with, it 
is far from clear why non-instrumental value is not sufficient to ground direct 
obligations to protect the environment. It is hard to see what great advantages 
are lost if one has to concede that these obligations are ultimately grounded 
in relational properties of natural objects. The interest in enabling ascriptions 
of intrinsic value to nature was primarily to enable environmental ethicists to 
argue in favour of direct, non-contingent obligations to preserve the Earth’s 
ecosystems. However, non-instrumental value ascriptions already suffice to 
ground such direct obligations.30 In fact, the demand that our duties to protect 
27. Moore ([1922] 1959, 269) presses a more general argument along these lines.
28. Blackburn (1984, 217–220) responds similarly to the same kind of worry.
29. This kind of response on behalf of the constructivist is in the same spirit as Robert Elliot’s 
(1996): namely, it rests on what might be described as a ‘rigidification maneuver’ (227). The 
truth conditions for our claims about what would be valuable in other possible worlds – in-
cluding worlds in which we have very different psychologies – are fixed by facts about how 
we are disposed to value in the actual world (see also Lewis 1989, 132f).
30. When Moore ([1903] 1994) introduces the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value 
in Principia Ethica, he explains that the importance of the distinction is that only intrinsic 
value claims can ground universal moral principles. We note with interest that in Principia, 
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the environment be grounded solely in the intrinsic properties of natural ob-
jects unnecessarily limits the range of considerations that can serve as moral 
reasons to preserve and protect. For instance, one might wish to point to an 
ecosystem’s being untampered with by humans as moral grounds for protect-
ing it – or at any rate, as grounds for preserving it, rather than, say, destroying 
it and replacing it with an engineered ecosystem. 
There is nothing objectionably anthropocentric about a moral judgement of 
this sort. And yet, the property of being untampered with is surely an extrinsic 
property of any given ecosystem. Thus, if the sort of value required to ground 
direct moral obligations is value-dependent solely on intrinsic properties, 
we could not countenance the existence of an obligation to preserve or pre-
fer untampered environments. In any case, as John O’Neill (1992) observes, 
anti-realists can accommodate intrinsic value judgements. For an expressivist, 
to judge an ecosystem intrinsically valuable in Moore’s sense is just to non-
instrumentally value the ecosystem because of its intrinsic properties. There 
is no reason to suppose that appraisers cannot so value an ecosystem. For the 
constructivist, meanwhile, an appraiser’s judgement that an ecosystem is in-
trinsically valuable is a belief with the content that, were her beliefs and desires 
in reflective equilibrium, she would non-instrumentally value that ecosystem 
because of its intrinsic properties (ibid., 125). 
So what about the third notion of intrinsic value: objective value, or value 
that is independent of appraisers? It might be argued that anti-realists cannot 
countenance judgements ascribing this kind of intrinsic value to objects. After 
all, whether or not a thing has value will depend, at least for constructivists, 
upon its relations to appraisers – in particular, on whether appraisers are dis-
posed to value, or else to subscribe to norms that require valuing such a thing. 
The expressivist may meet this objection by explaining that the norm they ex-
press subscription to prescribes that agents value nature regardless of whether 
it is valued by actual appraisers. However, the constructivist might have to 
concede that this type of intrinsic value is unavailable to her.31 Exactly how 
great a disadvantage this is for the constructivist environmentalist is not clear 
but, as we shall see in section four, objectivism may well be an obstacle to their 
cause.32 Nevertheless, we do not think that this should make environmental 
he contrasts intrinsic value with ‘value as a means’ (ibid., 72–75), or what we are calling 
instrumental value. For more argument to the effect that non-instrumental value is of greater 
moral importance than intrinsic value, narrowly defined, see Shelly Kagan’s (1998) essay 
‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’. Kagan’s essay is noteworthy in that it advocates that the term 
‘intrinsic value’ be expanded so that its denotation includes non-instrumental value that is 
grounded in an object’s extrinsic properties. 
31. Some scholars, such as Street (2016), have argued that anti-realist constructivists can also 
defend moral objectivity claims; however the level of that objectivity is not as robust as it is 
for realism, and the truth of moral claims ultimately depends on the judgements of the valuer.
32. In their empirical study on moral objectivism, Geoffrey Goodwin and John Darley (2010, 
184) say that they ‘would predict that if a moral value is thought to be objective, it is more 
likely to be afforded a sacred or protected status – and thus, an individual will be unwilling to 
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ethicists wary of constructivism. On balance, for the environmentalists’ aims, 
the most important conception of intrinsic value seems to be that of non-in-
strumental value, since it is sufficient to ground direct obligations to protect 
the environment. Further, as John O’Neill et al. (2008) point out: ‘[w]hile the 
rejection of realism does not rule out non-humans having intrinsic value, nei-
ther do realist positions rule it in’ (118).
It may be worth addressing another kind of judgement that anti-realists 
might be thought unable to accommodate, and which environmental ethicists 
might be loath to give up. Even if anti-realists can accommodate judgements 
to the effect that nature has non-instrumental (and even intrinsic) value, they 
cannot accommodate the thought that nature has the property of being non-
instrumentally valuable or important; nor can they accommodate the claim that 
it is a fact that nature is non-instrumentally valuable. This kind of objection is 
best seen as directed against expressivists, in particular. Constructivists, after 
all, have never denied that there are moral facts or properties; they claim only 
that such facts and properties are stance-dependent. 
However, even expressivists accommodate judgements of this sort by 
adopting a deflationary or minimalist account of facts and properties. Paul 
Horwich (1993, 73–74) argues, for instance, that to say that it is a fact that x 
is F, or that x has the property of being F, is to say nothing more than x is F 
(see also Blackburn 1998, 75–83; Gibbard 2003, 182–183). Expressivists who 
adopt this strategy soon confront the question of what distinguishes this kind 
of expressivism from moral realism; after all, like realists, they are now will-
ing to assent to the claim that there are stance-independent moral facts. The 
most straightforward reply cites the fact that expressivists offer an account of 
the function of moral discourse that is different from the account advanced 
by realists – namely, the central function of moral sentences is to express the 
acceptance of norms (see Stoljar 1993). In addition, Allan Gibbard highlights 
a difference in the order of explanation: whereas realists offer an account of 
moral judgements that begins with moral facts, expressivists offer an account 
of moral facts that begins with the nature of moral judgement – an account that 
does not, in the first instance, make reference to moral facts. 
4. REVISION, OBSTINACY AND CONSENSUS
Finally, let us turn to an argument against moral realism’s usefulness for the 
environmental ethicists’ agenda. We argue that the widespread acceptance of 
realism may well be an obstacle to delivering on what many believe to be an 
indispensable shift in moral attitudes. The argument is roughly as follows: if 
(1) commonly held moral views, particularly on harm and responsibility, are 
compromise on that value when deciding how to vote’. However, they concede that ‘no data 
exist to support this contention, and so it is a task for future research to examine it’ (ibid.).
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mistaken and detrimental to the environmentalist cause, and (2) in order to 
address environmental problems, (a large proportion of) moral agents need 
to change their views accordingly and (3) belief in the truth of moral realism 
makes people less likely to revise their moral views than beliefs in anti-realism, 
then (4) all other things being equal, a widespread acceptance of (or belief in 
the truth of) moral realism would be undesirable for the environmental ethicist.
As to the first two premises of the argument: environmental ethicists regu-
larly argue that ‘commonsense morality’ is ill-equipped to support stringent 
obligations towards the environment, to acknowledge the moral wrongness 
of aggregate harms or to make us value nature in the way that we should. 
Consequently, many advocate for ‘new’ values and virtues (Jamieson 2010, 
2014; O’Neill et al. 2008). For instance, Dale Jamieson (1992, 2010) thinks 
that commonsense morality’s presuppositions about harm and responsibility 
stand in the way of perceiving individual actions as harmful in the context of 
climate change. He argues that, ‘[u]nless we develop new values and concep-
tions of responsibility, we will have enormous difficulty in motivating people 
to respond to this problem’ (Jamieson 1992, 149f). Authors such as Judith 
Lichtenberg (2010) and Elizabeth Cripps (2011) argue that we have to move 
away from a widespread belief in harm as an individualist notion, and towards 
accepting that individually harmless actions that are harmful in aggregate may 
violate the harm principle.33 
Turning to the third premise, we argue that a belief in moral realism may 
be an obstacle to revising one’s moral views, based on the results of several 
empirical studies conducted by Geoffrey Goodwin and John Darley (2008; 
2010; 2012) on moral objectivism. These studies found evidence that objectiv-
ist attitudes are correlated with a greater degree of closed-mindedness.34 They 
found that the more a subject treated a given moral judgement as objective, 
‘[a] the less comfortable they were with another person’s disagreeing with 
that belief, [b] the more immoral they thought this other person was, and [c] 
the less they thought it was possible they themselves could change their mind 
with respect to the belief in question’ (Goodwin and Darley 2012, 254). To be 
clear, Goodwin and Darley have thus far uncovered only a correlation – they 
have not established whether objectivist attitudes cause obstinacy of this sort. 
However, they are fairly clear that ‘[p]erceived objectivity negatively predicted 
participants’ self-rated likelihood of ever giving up the moral belief over which 
disagreement had arisen’ (ibid., 253), and they point out that: ‘objectivity pre-
dicted both discomfort with a disagreeing other person … and attributions of 
immorality to this person’ (ibid.). A potential link between realist attitudes and 
33. Derek Parfit (1986) has a similar point concerning collective harm more generally.
34. Goodwin and Darley focused on the ‘objective’ versus ‘subjective’ nature of moral beliefs, 
and therefore did not phrase the results of their research as claims about realism versus 
anti-realism.
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obstinacy should at least temper the degree to which environmental and cli-
mate ethicists welcome the spread of a realist moral outlook.
Two caveats are due at this point. First, one might wonder about the par-
ticular notion of objectivity used by Goodwin and Darley (2012), and whether 
it really corresponds to a realist outlook. One way in which they attempted to 
establish the perceived ‘objectivity’ of statements was to ask participants to 
agree or disagree with statements with ethically pertinent (and other) content, 
and to then indicate ‘the extent to which they thought there was a correct an-
swer as to whether each statement was true’ on a six-point scale, ‘with higher 
numbers indicating greater objectivity’ (ibid., 251). A second measure of per-
ceived objectivity was established by telling participants in a second stage that 
another person had disagreed with them concerning the initial statement, and 
to ask them about ‘the extent to which they thought the disagreeing other per-
son was mistaken, as opposed to neither party being mistaken’ (ibid.). The 
authors write that: ‘[t]he two measures of objectivity were well correlated with 
each other … and so for each item, we averaged these two measures to form a 
composite index of objectivity’ (ibid., ellipsis added).
Goodwin and Darley’s first measure of objectivity corresponds to what we 
have referred to as ‘moral cognitivism’ and ‘success theory’ – two of the key 
characteristics of moral realism – that is, the idea that moral propositions are 
truth-apt, and the idea that some moral propositions are actually true. While 
these are features of moral realism, they are also features of some forms of 
moral anti-realism, such as constructivism. In other words, the first measure of 
objectivity does not uniquely establish a realist position. What about the second 
measure of objectivity employed by Goodwin and Darley? Participants were 
asked if two contradicting moral propositions can both be correct. According 
to the authors, rejecting this claim is an indicator of an objectivist stance. But 
is it a measure of moral realism? Strictly speaking, rejecting this idea does not 
commit one to moral realism; constructivists and some types of expressivists 
may well reject this claim, too. In other words, Goodwin and Darley’s second 
measure of objectivism does not directly match onto the third feature of real-
ism as laid out above: stance independence. However, one might think that 
some of those who reject stance independence would happily agree that two 
contradicting moral propositions can both be correct: namely, relativists and 
subjectivists. 
Goodwin and Darley’s conclusions concerning the effects of what they call 
moral ‘objectivism’ may thus be thought not to transfer directly to moral ‘re-
alism’, strictly speaking, since their measure of objectivism does not wholly 
correspond to a realist stance. However, we propose a more nuanced approach. 
Given that most ‘ordinary’ people are not scholarly meta-ethicists, it seems 
reasonable to think that those who would endorse Goodwin and Darley’s ob-
jectivist claims are in fact those who (with regard to the issue in question) have 
realist tendencies. Most ‘ordinary’ people are not familiar with sophisticated 
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versions of anti-realism and, when they disagree that two contradicting moral 
propositions on any given issue can both be correct, then it is very plausible to 
assume that they do so because they endorse stance independence and are thus 
realists, at least with regard to that particular issue. Moreover, if it so happens 
that people have a realist bent with regard to environmental virtues and values, 
then it appears that they would in fact be less inclined to change their mind in 
this regard, and would be less comfortable with those who disagree with them.35 
This should make a realist stance look unattractive to environmentalists.
An additional argument against moral realism concerns the need to produce 
a politically feasible consensus on environmental values. Apart from greater 
reluctance to change one’s mind, another source of concern arises from the 
correlation between realists’ discomfort with diverging views and their greater 
attributions of immorality to those with whom they disagree. Light argued 
that having people on board is crucial to the success of the environmental-
ist agenda – and that, in order to get them on board, it would be wise to not 
discard anthropocentric values altogether. Indeed, in the face of rampant cli-
matic change and environmental degradation there is a special urgency that 
the global community reach a workable consensus regarding our obligations 
vis-à-vis environmental protection. 
5. ANTI-REALISM AND CONSENSUS
We believe that the strength of a moral anti-realist outlook lies in its better 
enabling such consensus. Before we argue for this, let us turn briefly to a coun-
terargument. A realist might argue as follows: if we accept moral realism is 
true, then we accept that there is a single true standard of morally right action. 
Any moral disagreement would indicate that at least one party’s beliefs are 
mistaken, and the recognition of this would spur parties to continue moral 
deliberation and inquiry until a consensus is reached. By contrast, if we ac-
cept some form of anti-realism, then we should not see fundamental moral 
disagreement as evidence that someone is mistaken in their moral judgements. 
Because each party has no grounds for thinking that their own moral judge-
ments are defective, they have no reason – or at any rate, they have less reason 
than they would given the acceptance of realism – to remain engaged in debate 
or be willing to revise their own judgements in light of considerations brought 
forth by others.36
35. Goodwin and Darley (2012) observe that: ‘[o]bjectivity scores reliably predicted discomfort 
with another person’ (252) and ‘[p]erceived objectivity negatively predicted participants’ 
self-rated likelihood of ever giving up the moral belief over which disagreement had arisen’ 
(253). One of the measures of discomfort seemed to be whether or not participants would 
have someone who they disagree with as a housemate.
36. David Brink (1986, 37) argues along these lines, while Robert Elliot (1996, 230) considers 
this sort of argument and offers a reply on behalf of moral constructivism. 
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However, we argue that the prospects for consensus may well be more 
promising from an anti-realist outlook. Many anti-realists agree that the very 
point of moral discourse and deliberation is to facilitate social cooperation. 
On the constructivist side, John Rawls (1980) characterises an essential part 
of the ‘social role of morality’ as ‘achieving the more or less minimum condi-
tions of effective social cooperation, for example, by specifying standards to 
settle competing claims and setting up rules for coordinating and stabilizing 
social arrangements’ (553). On the expressivist side, Allan Gibbard (1990, 76) 
writes: ‘[t]he chief biological function of normative discussion is to coordinate. 
Normative discussion allows for common enterprises and adjusts the terms of 
reciprocity…’ (see also Blackburn 1998, 39; Lenman 2007, 75f). If this is the 
function of moral discourse, then, insofar as we engage in moral deliberation 
at all, there will be pressure on us to seek consensus with potential coopera-
tors. Thus, Gibbard (1990) continues, ‘[f]or such a mechanism [as normative 
discussion] to work, two things are needed: tendencies towards consensus, and 
normative governance. Normative discussion must tend toward all accepting 
the same norms, and acceptance of norms must tend to guide action’ (76). 
In defending his constructivist ‘ideal advisor’ account of normative reasons, 
Michael Smith ([1995] 2004) goes further: that the appraiser aims at consen-
sus with other rational appraisers is constitutive of the sort of ideal normative 
deliberation that determines what the normative facts are (ibid., 27).
For the anti-realist, then, the very point of engaging in moral deliberation 
and inquiry would be undermined if she did not seek consensus with those in 
her community with whom she disagrees morally. For a realist, by contrast, 
the point of moral inquiry is to discover the stance-independent moral facts, 
whatever they may be. A failure of convergence should move us to revise our 
moral judgements, therefore, only if it indicates that our judgements do not 
accurately reflect the moral facts. But if we are not in doubt as to the accuracy 
of our own moral judgements, the mere fact of dissent gives us no reason 
to revise our judgements. Importantly, this point holds for both those realists 
who are little concerned with the environment and those who take to the other 
extreme and regard humans as planet Earth’s ‘disease’. If Light is correct, and 
a pragmatic and – above all – workable consensus is to be found at neither 
extreme, then constructivist and expressivist approaches to morality may be 
more promising than realism.37
37. Of course, an anti-realist may encounter interlocutors whose attitudes are so incongruent 
with her own that she concludes that engagement with those others will be pointless. Anti-
realism should therefore not be taken to counsel us to resolve all moral disagreements, no 
matter what our interlocutors’ starting commitments may be. But, in this respect, the anti-re-
alist’s predicament is no different from the realist’s. A realist who encounters an interlocutor 
whose moral judgements are vastly different from her own is likely to conclude that her 
interlocutor is so confused, blind or deluded that no amount of discussion will get that person 
on track. Moreover, the realist might see no prospect that her own mind will be changed by 
the thoughts of her interlocutor.
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6. CONCLUSION
To the extent that environmental ethics is concerned with promoting an en-
vironmentalist agenda, there may be good reasons not to overemphasise the 
objectivity of those values, to fight anti-realist attitudes or else to prefer or-
dinary people to be moral realists in this regard. Many plausible varieties 
of moral anti-realism enable us to ascribe non-instrumental value to nature. 
According to the empirical evidence available, avowals of moral anti-realism 
do not weaken agents’ motivation to comply with their acknowledged obliga-
tions. Moreover, the sorts of realist avowals that seem to strengthen motivation 
are licensed by sophisticated anti-realist theories. Further, the acceptance of 
moral realism may come with significant disadvantages with respect to achiev-
ing a consensus on first-order ethical matters. Empirical research indicates that 
realist-sounding avowals are associated with a greater resistance to revising 
one’s moral judgements, and a greater aversion towards dissenters. Since anti-
realists regard aiming at convergence to be constitutive of moral deliberation, 
anti-realist theories have at least one indisputable advantage with respect to the 
prospects of convergence. 
Yet, to what extent is our argument specific to the domain of environmen-
talism? Clearly, questions of moral motivation, the source of moral value and 
the possibility of ethical consensus are of general importance to both lived mo-
rality and moral philosophy. However, we believe that these issues converge 
with a specific and growing urgency in the environmentalism debate that is 
unique to this domain.38 The question of objective (and therefore non-anthro-
pocentric) value seems especially relevant to how we relate to nature, whereas 
it might seem less troubling where human wellbeing is directly concerned. 
Further, with the advent of dramatically accelerating climate change, there is 
an increasingly pressing, urgent need for a workable ethical consensus at the 
political level, and for morally motivated agents at the individual level. As we 
have shown in this article, environmentalists (which on our understanding in-
cludes all environmental ethicists) therefore have good reason to prefer at least 
some forms of moral anti-realism over realism.
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